SARC on dust, death and dodgy fish

The Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee’s 13th Alert Digest for the year (considering a record number of bills, at least in recent years) highlights three Charter issues:

  • Asbestos Diseases Compensation Bill: SARC queries whether the new procedures designed to take account of the lengthy latency and fatal result of asbestos diseases should be extended to cover non-asbestos diseases with similar charcateristics, pursuant to the Charter right to equal and effective protection against (impairment) discrimination.
  • Coroners BIll: SARC expresses its concern that the Bill will amend the Charter’s definition of ‘court’ to cover the newly created Coroners Court, thus bringing the new body within the Charter’s partial exemption for courts and tribunals from the conduct mandate (despite the new body having no role in either developing the common law or resolving private disputes.) SARC will ask the Attorney-General what the (exempt) non-administrative capacities of the Coroners Court would be and whether there are any ‘exceptional circumstances’ (a la the override provision) that justify a permanent narrowing of the Charter’s protection for human rights.
  • Primary Industries Legislation Amendment BIll: SARC commends an excellent statement of compatibility, but also has (what, for it, are) strong words about one provision, which significantly extends an existing offence of selling or possessing an illegally taken fish to cover selling or possessing a fish that has ever been illegally ‘dealt with’ under any Australian law. ‘Dealt with’ includes just about anything anyone ever does with the fish, including transporting and possessing it.  SARC has two concerns: First, that the existing offence includes a reverse onus on the issue of whether the defendant knew or ought to have known of the illegality. This is especially concerning, because the offence applies to consumers, not just commercial operators, and it carries a potential six month sentence. Second, the headings of both the existing provision and the amendment only refer to sale, not possession, so people who plan to possess a fish will have to read the text of the provision to know that they risk prison unless they can prove that they didn’t know about any illegal dealings. The strong words:

The Committee therefore considers that clause 68 may be incompatible with the Charter.

 SARC referred the issue of compatibility with Charter s. 25(1) to parliament and will write to the Miister about the headings (and the otherwise excellent statement of compatibility.)

A question of reputation

Black Inc Books, mysteriously undeterred by my negative-reviews-only policy, and the fact that I only review Charter books, has sent me a free copy of A Question of Power by Michelle Schwarz on the allegations that Geoff Clark raped several women in the early 1970s. I’ve followed this story with some interest since the allegations were publicised in 2001. Moreover, I was in Warrnambool recently speaking on the Charter at a Deakin Law School conference and was curious to know why such a scenic and well-located town isn’t better regarded as a holiday destination in Victoria. The Warrnambool tourist agency won’t be a big fan of this book, with its hair-raising claims of rape gangs roaming the streets in the 1970s and racists sipping lattes in the cafes in the 2000s.

But I’m a big fan and will definitely look up Schwarz’s other book, on the death of David Hookes. While the ‘true crime’ genre should be a natural for my interests, I’m no fan of blood-soaked yarns about nasty criminals, screeds against institutionalised racism or a cheap shot dig at the justice system. So, A Question of Power is my kinda crime reporting book, featuring detailed interviews with all parties and careful analysis of transcripts, including letting the subjects and, especially, the transcripts do most of the talking.

Writing about rape allegations is a very tricky thing for rights-oriented folks. Our instinctive reaction in favour of criminal defendants runs hard up against our knowledge of the sexism and nastiness of the criminal justice response to rape. Trying to stay true to both instincts is hard. I did my thesis on the presumption of innocence in rape trials in an attempt to walk the tightrope, and more recently tried to find commonalities in the legal wrongs done to each side in DNA cases. Schwarz, a former lawyer, doesn’t leap for the objectivity of legal analysis and policy arguments. Instead, she delves into the significant credibility issues on both sides. Her account of Carol Stingel’s tale shows clearly how compelling Stingel’s case is. Equally her examination of not just the federal and country town politics involved in Clark’s case but also the politics within Framlingham (home of Clark and a rival family including his other main accuser) is revelatory. She doesn’t reveal her conclusions (though it’s clear that she doubts Jo McGuiness’s tale) but I’d like to think that all the parties she interviewed (which is all of them apart from politicians), and especially Clark and Stingel, would think that her account was fair. That’s no mean feat!

Schwarz’s major opinions are reserved for Andrew Rule, author of ‘Power and Rape’, the newspaper article that aired the revelations, basically ending Clark’s career. I was very unhappy with Rule’s article when it came out, but my views have softened on airing accounts of crimes outside the judicial process. Schwarz’s argument focusses, not on the airing of the allegations, but on the lack of balance in Rule’s article. Most notably, she argues that it omits all of the bitter Framlingham politics that surrounded McGuiness’s claims. Unfortunately, the Walkley-award-winning article doesn’t seem to be available on the net, so I can’t check her account, but if it’s true then the article isn’t an account, but rather an attack. The Charter has something to say about such attacks:

13 A person has the right-… (b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked.

Of course, Rule isn’t bound by the Charter, although his article might (might!) run into trouble under the ALRC’s privacy proposal. According to Schwarz, Rule was initially happy to talk with her, but cut off contact once she revealed that her book wouldn’t have the same tone as his article. If that’s true, then Rule is a tool.

But what about the other sort of rule that is implicated in this story?: the Victorian laws that facilitated Stingel’s successful civil claim against Clark, which added the state’s imprimatur to the allegations aired by Rule. Continue reading

The Charter and risk assessment

A second case on the interaction of two major Victorian statutes of 2006, the Charter and the Disability Act, is now online. Both involve supervised treatment orders under the latter statute:

193(3) A supervised treatment order must- (a) state that the Authorised Program Officer is responsible for the implementation of the supervised treatment order; (b) require the person to whom the supervised treatment order applies to reside in premises approved by the Authorised Program Officer; (c) refer to the treatment plan which must be attached to the supervised treatment order; (d) specify the period for which the supervised treatment order is to continue in force, being a period not exceeding 1 year.

The first case, MM (Guardianship) [2008] VCAT 1282, blogged about here, involved a narrow and unusual question: whether or not supervised treatment orders should be made in relation to someone who wants to be treated but, due to an intellectual disability, lacks the capacity to fully consent. Disappointingly, VCAT Deputy John Billings opted for a broad reasonable limits analysis – which, of course, the detention regime passed with flying colours – without applying the interpretation mandate to the specific provision in dispute. The new case, LM (Guardianship) [2008] VCAT 2084, looks at a much broader question about the limits of the detention regime and does a better, but still inadequate, job.

As always, the facts are heartbreaking. Following childhood behavioural problems, LM was diagnosed at the age of 13 with a ‘borderline to mild intellectual disability’ and a plethora of mental disorders, as well as non-epileptic seizures. As an adult, she attracted a criminal record, including for threatening a woman and a child in a McDonald’s toilet (in 2004) and, more recently, walking into traffic, carrying a controlled weapon and offensive public behaviour. She is presently on a good behaviour bond. Within various institutions, her behaviour included secreting knives and walking onto roads, both apparently with intent to suicide; aggression and threats towards staff; and repeated seizures. But there have been considerable improvements in her current location. Nevertheless, her current disability service provider considers it necessarty to lock the front door to that institution about 70% of the time (apparently so that she feels safe); to forcefully return her to the premises on a number of occasions when she climbed the back fence and headed for the road; to restrain her during seizures; and to engage the police to return her to the premises. They obtained an interim supervised treatment order to authorise these measures and now seek a non-interim order.

There’s little doubt that LM is unwell and poses some danger to herself. However, for better or for worse, treatment of those problems depends on other regimes, including other provisions of the Disability Act, the Mental Heath Act and the Guardianship and Administration Act. The supervised treatment order regime,  the sole regime permitting disability service providers to ‘detain’ anyone, is, by contrast, aimed at protecting others. No-one disputes that LM satisfies the threshold eligibility requirements for STOs: she has an intellectual disability, is in residential care and is being treated. But does she meet the core test of being a risk to others?:

191(6) VCAT can only make a supervised treatment order if VCAT is satisfied that- (a) the person has previously exhibited a pattern of violent or dangerous behaviour causing serious harm to another person or exposing another person to a significant risk of serious harm

What is ‘serious’ harm? The Disability Act doesn’t define the term, so VCAT Member Julie Grainger looked to definitions in the Cth and ACT Criminal Codes (defining serious harm as either life-threatening or longstanding) and the Migration Act (with a broader definition all sorts of potential hams.) She strangely didn’t consider the definition in in Victoria’s own Crimes Act – probably because it refers to ‘serious injury’, thus avoiding an Austlii search –  but it’s not a very helpful definition.

After noting that there’s a much stronger analogy between STOs and criminal punishment, Grainger opted for the Code definition, observing:

This definition is also compatible with, and promotes the human rights of persons with a disability by ensuring that human rights such as the right to recognition and equality before the law (section 8 of the Charter), the right to freedom of movement (section 12 of the Charter), the right to liberty and security of the person (section 21 of the Charter) and the right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 26 of the Charter) are limited only in the most serious of circumstances.

Fair enough. The reasoning here basically equates compatibility with ‘least possible intrusion’, which is fine, although it doesn’t really go beyond the traditional rule that requires strict construction of provisions that limit common law rights. The Charter supports a more nuanced interpretative approach:

21(2) A person must not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.

(3) A person must not be deprived of his or her liberty except on grounds, and in accordance with procedures, established by law.

An important precondition for avoiding arbitrariness in detention and for ensuring compliance with lawful requirements is for the provision authorising detention to be as clear and precise as possible. So, it’s vital that any interpretation come up with a definition that is not merely minimalist but also not susceptible to widely inconsistent factual applications.

Grainger’s definition strikes me as fitting that bill, but her application of the test to LM strikes me as very problematic.

Continue reading

Conference Q&A

One of the best things about human rights laws is the conferences. While I (and everyone I know) doesn’t much like conferences themselves – the locations are another matter – because the papers tend to be narrow, poorly presented and disconnected from one another, human rights conferences tend to produce interesting, connected and (better) presented papers. Friday’s annual Protecting Human Rights Conference was no exception. As the final speaker for the event, I was a bit too distracted to listen carefully to every speech, so I’m looking forward to the papers appearing online (apparently at the end of this week.) Prof. Johannes Chan’s paper, in particular, looks to be a superb and much needed summary of HK human rights cases.

But what did keep me alert was the Q&A’s, where new and interesting things often emerge. Here’s my summary and takes on some of those:

Charter s. 35: Carolyn Evans, in her summary of this-year-in-the-Charter, called for the repeal of Charter s. 35, the Charter’s provision requiring notice to the A-G and VEOHRC of Charter issues in the higher courts, arguing that it hampered making Charter arguments. Pamela Tate and another questioner queried her on that call, citing her comment that the MHRB decisions to date involved not-especially-helpful legal arguments and the supposed inconsistency there. Tate revealed that Charter s. 35 was requested by the courts, who wanted better legal arguments on the Charter. She also suggested that Charter s.35 notices don’t cause delays, citing the weekend turnaround on Sabet’s request for a stay of the HPRB’s decision to suspend him. Evans, in response, mooted making Charter s. 35 transitional but ultimately opted for immediate abolition, referring to the potential for Charter s. 35 to yield government-backed, rather than neutral, legal analysis.

I say: too bloody right. No-one should put the Charter in a corner. Or, to put it more fully (including some of what I said in my own talk):

  • The problems of Charter s. 35 in practice can’t be measured by what happens after notices are issued, but rather by the potential for litigants to choose not to issue notices (and therefore make arguments) at all. Sabet, who initiated a Charter-specific claim in the Supreme Court, is hardly a case in point; rather, the relevant concern is a lawyer who thinks up a Charter claim just before or in a trial and is deterred by the threat of a costs order due to the Supreme Court’s appalling Practice Note No. 3 of 2008. More generally, even a short procedural requirement prevents the Charter from being brought up instinctively, regularly and urgently. Why should it be any harder to raise the Charter than any other statute?
  • The supposed necessity of legal advice from the A-G & VEOHRC is an insult, not only to other lawyers, but also to the County and Supreme Courts. Why would the State’s most senior judges have so much difficulty coming to terms with a forty-nine section statute that’s been around for over two years now and is the subject of a couple of excellent texts, including an annotation? And what’s the case for treating the Charter differently to other legislation (remembering that the Charter is the weakest statute in Victoria?) The fact that the judiciary asked for Charter s. 35 strikes me as another worrying sign that Victoria’s courts are no enthusiasts for the Charter, and in particular its ubiquitous use in our courtrooms. It makes me wonder: did they ask for Charter s. 4(1)(j) too?
  • It’s also worth noting that Evans’s comments about the need for legal advice related to proceedings in the MHRB, not the SC or the CC which are where Charter s. 35 applies.
  • The risk of the supposedly helpful legal advice really being the government line in disguise, alluded to by Evans, is all too real. A number of speakers pointed out the lack of funding for VEOHRC to make submissions. Instead, as I argued in my paper, the interventions have all been from the A-G and are all against rights claims. See below.

Charter s. 32: Continue reading

The right to a parliamentary debate

The abortion debate yields another first: the first (to my knowledge) published legal advice on the Charter as part of a political debate. Such advices are a regular part of the landscape in other jurisdictions with human rights laws, so it’s surely a positive development. The advice is from Phillips Fox to Catholic Health Australia Inc and is written (or signed) by partners Nigel Preston and Rachel Walsh. So, did CHA get their money’s worth?

The major claim of the advice is that there should have been a statement of compatibility with respect to clause 8. The problem is Charter s. 48:

48 Nothing in this Charter affects any law applicable to abortion or child destruction, whether before or after the commencement of Part 2.

Preston and Walsh’s argument is:

Section 48 is a savings provision, intended to protect laws concerning abortion from being interfered with by or challenged under the Charter, whenever they came into effect. In particular, section 48 was intended to protect the common law on abortion from challenge under section 9 of the Charter…  Indeed, an early exposure draft of the Charter contained a caveat to the Right to Life provision that it applied only after birth.

Insofar as the Bill is concerned with legalising or decriminalising aspects of abortion, it is correct to say that those provisions are not subject to the legislative processes established by the Charter. However, the problem is that this Bill affects rights other than those concerned with the decriminalisation of abortion. Clause 8 of the Bill contains provisions that go beyond the remit of section 48 of the Charter, and so should be subject to the Charter’s process for scrutinising the Bill for compatibility with human rights and to other Charter provisions (including the interpretive obligation in section 32).

Whereas SARC, in its report, focussed on the words ‘law’, ‘applicable’ and ‘affects’, this argument centres on Charter s. 48’s alleged purpose, tying it exclusively to the ‘legalising or decrininalising aspects’ of abortion and child destruction. I’m not so sure that the criminal law angle on abortion can be so readily separated from the medical law angle – or that the purpose of Charter s. 48 can be precisely discerned – but there’s no doubt that the scope of Charter s. 48 is quite a quandary.

So, what are the consequences if parts of the bill are outside Charter s. 48’s scope? That depends on these two sections:

28(1) A member of Parliament who proposes to introduce a Bill into a House of Parliament must cause a statement of compatibility to be prepared in respect of that Bill.

(2) A member of Parliament who introduces a Bill into a House of Parliament, or another member acting on his or her behalf, must cause the statement of compatibility prepared under subsection (1) to be laid before the House of Parliament into which the Bill is introduced before giving his or her second reading speech on the Bill.

(3) A statement of compatibility must state- (a) whether, in the member’s opinion, the Bill is compatible with human rights and, if so, how it is compatible; and (b) if, in the member’s opinion, any part of the Bill is incompatible with human rights, the nature and extent of the incompatibility.

29 A failure to comply with section 28 in relation to any Bill that becomes an Act does not affect the validity, operation or enforcement of that Act or of any other statutory provision.

Preston and Walsh say:

You may be confronted by an argument that the failure to comply with the Charter has no consequences. The basis of the argument is that the Charter requires a process of consideration of compatibility with human rights to be followed at the time of second reading of a Bill, but the Act which flows from the Bill is not invalidated if that process is not followed…. To our thinking, section 29 of the Charter is not the point in this case. The Bill is not yet an Act. This section is designed to remedy a mistake in the processes leading to an Act. This section is not a mechanism to avoid consideration of the Charter in relation to any Bill where the Charter should be considered.

That’s certainly true. But it does mean that this legal advice is actually about the legality of non-justiciable parliamentary process. Anyway, Preston and Walsh go on:

The central point is that the human rights protected by the Charter should have been considered at the time when this Bill was introduced into Parliament. The clear objective of the Charter is to facilitate a consideration of those human rights which are protected by the Charter in the debate on this Bill. The wrongful exclusion of the Charter from debate in relation to this Bill has cut short a proper consideration of the human rights which may be affected by the Bill. According to the second reading speech, the Charter was intended to promote a ‘dialogue model of human rights’, which ‘seeks to address human rights issues though a formal dialogue’ between branches of government. The exclusion of the Charter from debate contradicts this intended goal. It is not for us to say what might have happened if the Charter had been considered in Parliamentary debate. It is not for us to conjecture whether the Bill would have been amended, or not. This is a matter for Parliament, but more particularly, it is a matter for a properly informed Parliament.

Speaking of the ‘exclusion’ of the Charter from parliamentary debate is a little extreme. No-one’s stopping the Charter being mentioned there or elsewhere. All that’s missing is the statement of compatibility. (And, ahem, the Parliament was ‘informed’ (properly or otherwise) by SARC’s report. SARC suggested a similar conclusion on the possible requirement of a statement of compatibility, but by a different argument: that Charter s. 48 didn’t have any impact at all on Charter s. 28, because it only affects laws, not bills.)

The advice then goes on to suggest four rights that clause 8 limits: Continue reading

Three new (non-Charter) rights for Victorians

Amendments to the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 came into force today re-defining discrimination to include the following conduct:

  • unreasonable refusals by employers/principals/firms to accommodate the responsibilities that (a) people offered employment (b) employees (c) contract workers; and (d) partners in firms; have ‘as parents or carers’.
  • refusals by people who provide accommodation to allow a person with an impairment ‘to make reasonable alterations to that accommodation to meet his or her special needs’
  • refusals to ‘provide accommodation to a person with a visual, hearing or mobility impairment because that person has a guide dog’, including requiring that the dog stay elsewhere or charging a special fee

Unlike the previous amendments to the Act, these new rights do not add to or widen the definition of Charter rights. That’s because, while the Charter picks up the definition of discrimination in the EOA, it only does so in relation to discrimination on the basis of an attribute:

3(1) In this Charter… discrimination, in relation to a person, means discrimination (within the meaning of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995) on the basis of an attribute set out in section 6 of that Act

However, the new anti-discrimination rights in the new amendments alter the definition of discrimination to create a new ‘conduct-based’ sort of discrimination that is different to discrimination on the basis of an attribute. Here are how the alterations look:

3 The objectives of this Act are- (a) to promote recognition and acceptance of everyone’s right to equality of opportunity; (b) to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against people by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of various attributes; (c) to eliminate, as far as possible, sexual harassment; (d) to provide redress for people who have been discriminated against or sexually harassed.

7(1) Discrimination means direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of an attribute or a contravention of section 13A, 14A, 15A, 31A, 51 or 52.

It seems clear enough that the Charter’s concept of discrimination is now narrower than the EOA’s. Why – and why the Charter’s definition has to be tied to the EOA at all – remains a mystery. Of course, it might be arguable that roughly similar rights flow from Charter s. 8 (in relation to discrimination on the basis of impairment) and Charter s. 17 (protection of families and children.)

Human rights avalanche!

Too many human rights cases, too little time (and, yes, I’m never happy.) Here are some short points on the rush of human rights cases (or related cases or events) that have come out the past few days. I hope to get back to some of them:

  • Sham marriages: In Baiai & Ors, R (On The Application of) v Secretary of State For The Home Department [2008] UKHL 53, the House of Lords examined the compatibility of a statutory scheme that required people under immigration control who wanted to marry to get permission from Home Secretary with the ECHR right to marry. The Lords accepted that the scheme served an important function of preventing sham marriages (designed to advance a prospective immigrant’s domestic rights) – thus overturning a declaration of incompatibility that had been issued – but rejected the regulations applying the scheme, which rejected all applications from people who were in the UK without leave or on only short stays. While marriage is not (presently) part of Victorian law and the Charter has no right to marry, this decision may have some relevance to decisions by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages on whether or not to register relationships, in light of the Charter’s right of families to ‘protection’ by the State.
  • Discrimination against Mormons: In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2008] UKHL 56, the House of Lords rejected a complaint by the Mormons against a law that provided a rate reduction only for public places of worship, which excluded Mormon temples (which only Mormons can enter.) The majority applied the difficult rule of international human rights law that largely limits equality rights to the enjoyment of other protected rights (which arguably also applies to Charter s. 8) to hold that there’s no right against discrimination when it comes to differential building rates. (They followed an equally dubious decision that rejected a challenge to a law that provided relief from child support obligations to people who re-partner, but only with someone from the opposite sex.) Lord Scott of Forscote felt uneasy about this denial of rights, but held that any discrimination against non-public places of worship was justified because ‘secretive’ religions are divisive. Christ!
  • Rights of tenants: In Doherty & Ors v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57, the House of Lords gave its third judgment on the difficult question of the obligations of public authorities to tenants. Faced with ECtHR decisions holding that some evictions processes were incompatible with tenants’ right to respect for their home, the Lords refused to further widen the common law remedies against public authorities, holding that to do so would undermine the decision of the UK parliament to allow public authorities broad eviction rights in some instances. The decision (again) gives lie to Bob Carr’s claims about the problems the UKHRA supposedly holds for property owners trying to evict trespassers. It also re-affirms my doubts about the conduct of some Victorian lawyers in using the Charter to protect tenants from evictions by Victorian public authorities. Most importantly to me, this decision is highly notable for its detailed analysis of the UKHRA equivalent to Charter s. 38(2), a provision I think deserves a lot more attention.
  • Admissibility of private diaries: In Lifely v Lifely [2008] EWCA Civ 90, the Court of Appeal dealt with a miserable battle between two brothers over their late dad’s milk business. One brother had earlier convinced a court that some of the milk proceeds were intended to be shared between both sons; however, the other brother had since discovered the first brother’s diaries, which seemed to contradict testimony that had been given about what had been agreed. The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the right to respect for private life meant that the diaries shouldn’t be admitted; rather, not only should they be admitted as fresh evidence to contradict the earlier finding about the agreement, but the whole case should be revisited in light of the doubts the fresh evidence suggested about the first brother’s credibility. Interestingly, the case sounds a note of caution that the law on the protection of privacy may still have some way to develop and that inadmissibility may be the right remedy in an appropriate fact situation. Could be interesting in terms of the application of s138 of Victoria’s new Evidence Bill in civil cases.
  • Politicised criminal investigations: Two fascinating and incredibly high profile decisions on the discretionary powers of criminal investigators. The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in two decisions, upheld most aspects of an investigation by the country’s independent national investigators (the Scorpions) into the business affairs of the country’s next president, Jacob Zuma. Zuma raised a number of his rights under the SABoR, notably arguing that his right to dignity (the core right of SA rights jurisprudence) was being infringed by the stop-start investigation. The Court’s decision was largely statutory, albeit with repeated reference to human rights, and largely upheld the need for workable investigative powers to scrutinise corruption (especially in light of Zuma’s apparent unwillingness to cooperate in the investigation.) In In Corner House Research & Ors, R (On The Application of) v The Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, the House of Lords considered a decision of the Serious Fraud Office to drop an investigation of Saudi businesses after the Saudis threatened to stop cooperating in the war on terror. The Lords unanimously held that the decision was within the very broad ambit of prosecutorial discretion. This wasn’t an HRA case, but would seem to have relevance to the question of whether or not prosecutorial decision-making falls within the Charter s 38(2) defence to the conduct mandate.
  • Parole boards: A brief mention of the Charter’s exemption of parole boards from the definition of public authorities in a Victorian case involving a challenge to the revocation of parole following an adverse drug test.
  • Jack Thomas: It seems, he drew the short straw of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J as his special leave panel in his attempt to re-examine the Victorian Court of Appeal’s unfortunate decision to allow the Cth DPP a second bite of the cherry. Should be an interesting trial…
  • Equal Opportunity Review: The release of a review of equal opportunity processes in Victoria, with an emphasis on consistency with the Charter. Some highlights: changing VEOHRC’s name to Human Rights Victoria and introducing a ‘duty to eliminate discrimination’, a conduct-mandate-like legal rule, but without some of the Charter s. 39 limitations.

I could say more about all of these, especially that tenancy case. Whether I have the time is another matter…